Abstract. The popular assumption that mammals possess cognitive mapping abilities, that is that they are able to organize mentally a kind of global-view-from-above puzzle made of subsets of landmarks that are locally perceptible from given ground-level places, has never been demonstrated. Water maze experiments were designed to test this assumption in rats, Rattus norvegicus. Although they were given ample opportunity to build a cognitive map during the preceding training trials, the rats proved unable to navigate accurately towards a hidden goal, an escape platform, during the tests in which they were given no opportunities to use any other orientation mechanism. Although such results may not constitute definite proof against cognitive mapping in rats, they question its existence. In previous experiments purporting to show cognitive mapping, the animals may have used simpler orientation mechanisms. The results of this study suggest that, at least, the a priori assumption that mammals are capable of cognitive mapping should be abandoned.
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The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour
To account for the impressive orientation capabilities of bees, Apis mellifera, Gould (1986; see also Gould & Towne 1987) claimed that they may use a cognitive map of the environment. One of his arguments was that cognitive mapping abilities have been acknowledged for a long time in mammals such as rodents, hence there is no a priori reason to deny such abilities to bees, given their high orientation performances. Cartwright & Collett (1987) and Dyer & Seeley (1989) showed, however, that the orientation behaviour of bees could be accounted for without evoking any cognitive mapping. Furthermore, well-controlled experiments have later dismissed cognitive maps in bees (Wehner et al. 1990; Wehner & Menzel 1990; Wehner & Wehner 1990; Dyer 1991; Dyer et al. 1993; Kirchner & Braun 1994) .
On the other hand, one can address the question whether mammals really do have cognitive mapping abilities, as has often been assumed. The answer is not so obvious. In line with the pioneering studies by Tolman (1948) and O' Keefe & Nadel (1978) , the concept of a cognitive map has been employed to express an animal's ability to return to a goal by processing the location-based (site-dependent) information provided by the current apparent configuration of landmarks. This implies that the goal location has been previously memorized (through latent learning) as a panoramic view specifying the apparent configuration of surrounding landmarks as perceived from this place. When the goal panorama and the panorama currently experienced share common landmarks, a mammal can navigate straight to the goal by comparing the two panoramas (Collett et al. 1986; Benhamou et al. 1995; Benhamou & Poucet 1996) . Such 'local' place navigation has been clearly demonstrated in water maze experiments on rats, Rattus norvegicus (Morris 1981; Sutherland & Dyck 1984) . Further studies showed that rats (Sutherland et al. 1987; Whishaw 1991; Arolfo et al. 1994 ) and mice, Mus musculus (Alyan 1994), need to explore the environment before they can navigate efficiently. These results support the hypothesis that this type of navigation can be accounted for by associative memory processes rather than by cognitive mapping (Whishaw 1991; Benhamou et al. 1995) .
In contrast, the concept of a true cognitive map (survey map) over a familiar environment implies the ability of an animal to establish the spatial
